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Reconstructing what you said: Text Inference
Using Smartphone Motion
Duncan Hodges, Oliver Buckley
Abstract—Smartphones and tablets are becoming ubiquitous within our connected lives and as a result these devices are increasingly
being used for more and more sensitive applications, such as banking. The security of the information within these sensitive
applications is managed through a variety of different processes, all of which minimise the exposure of this sensitive information to
other potentially malicious applications. This paper documents experiments with the ‘zero-permission’ motion sensors on the device as
a side-channel for inferring the text typed into a sensitive application. These sensors are freely accessible without the phone user
having to give permission. The research was able to, on average, identify nearly 30% of typed bigrams from unseen words, using a
very small volume of training data, which was less than the size of a tweet. Given the natural redundancy in language this performance
is often enough to understand the phrase being typed. We found that large devices were typically more vulnerable, as were users who
held the device in one hand whilst typing with fingers. Of those bigrams which were not correctly identified over 60% of the errors
involved the space bar and nearly half of the errors are within two keys on the keyboard.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
THE use of mobile devices, whether smartphonesor tablets, has become ubiquitous with our hyper-
connected lives [1]. They are now used for not only commu-
nicating with friends and family but also for performing all
sorts of tasks ranging from accessing the internet through to
more sensitive applications such as shopping and banking.
Many popular sites report that access from mobile devices
is more far common than ‘traditional’ laptop / desktop
access. This shift in the use of mobile devices from a per-
sonal communication tool to a personal ‘productivity’ tool
has increased the amount of potentially sensitive material
and activity performed on them. These smartphones have
become increasingly personal and how we trust others and
share these phones has become increasingly complicated [2].
As these devices now hold such sensitive information
it is more important than ever to be able to secure them
and much research has been performed on the permissions
model governing them (e.g. [3], [4], [5], [6]). This permis-
sions model, in addition to the file storage model [7], are the
key mechanisms by which the Android devices attempt to
protect sensitive information in one application from other,
potentially malicious, applications. The research presented
in this paper explores one particular way to bypass this
security model such that one application can ‘read’ the data
being typed in another application. In essence this creates
a keylogger capable of extracting sensitive data input into
other applications.
In this paper, we discuss an experiment using Android
smartphones and tablets that demonstrates it is possible
to infer the key presses on any Android smartphone or
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tablet purely from the motion sensors. The motion sensors
are freely accessible to applications on the device, without
express permission being sought from the user. This paper
continues in Section 2 with a discussion of the academic
background to this research, Section 3 then discusses an
experiment to explore typing on soft-keyboards. Section 4
discusses the analysis of the experimental data, whilst Sec-
tion 5 covers the implications for mobile users, app devel-
opers and device manufacturers. Finally the conclusions of
the paper are explored in Section 6.
2 BACKGROUND
Digital connectivity is becoming more increasingly inter-
twined with our daily lives and as a result the tasks that
are performed on smartphones and tablets have become
more personal and we have become inseparable from our
smartphones [8], 40% of smartphone users describe them
as ‘something they could not live without’ [9]. This degree
of dependence is twinned with an increase in the breadth
and sensitivity of tasks performed on these smartphones
with 43% looking for information about jobs, 40% accessing
Government services or information, 62% looking up infor-
mation about health conditions, 44% looking up real estate
listings or information about a place to live and 57% access
online banking services [9].
The standard approach to security on personal devices
is through a permissions-based model, which relies on the
users having the ability to perform a relatively complex risk-
based security decision in order to allow an application to
access potentially sensitive information (such as the address
book) or capability (such as location sensors). This compli-
cated model has been shown to be difficult for most users
to manage. This can be either because users are unable, or
unprepared, to fully realise the risk associated with grant-
ing permissions to an app [6] or because apps are ‘over-
priviliged’ meaning they request greater permissions than
are required to perform their function [10]. In addition to
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this permissions model, application sandboxing attempts to
limit the effect of an untrusted or malicious application. This
sandboxing attempts to ensure that an app cannot access
information within other, potentially sensitive, applications
(whether during execution or data ‘at-rest’). There have been
several pieces of malware on the Google Play store that
have been downloaded a significant number of times that
either fraudulently send SMS or perform other malicious
acts. Researchers have identified eleven such applications
which have each been installed over 5 million times [11].
In this research we are concerned with the side-channels
that could potentially allow information to leak from a
sensitive application to a malicious application. There has
been research which has considered the electromagnetic
and power profiles of the device in order to infer sensitive
information from within applications [12]. We particularly
focus on how the phone moves in order to infer information
from one sensitive application.
The sensors in smartphones have been used to good
effect to infer a wide range of information about an indi-
vidual solely based on the way that they interact with the
smartphone’s touchscreen, for example inferring the length
of the user’s thumb [13] and as a result estimating their
height or being used infer the user’s gender [14]. They
can also be used to infer the user’s gait patterns [15], the
activity being performed [16] even location and travel routes
[17], [18]. The accelerometers have also been used to infer
information outside the context of the device, effectively
using it as a network enabled sensor [19], [20].
Motion sensors within smartphones have previously
been used to attempt to infer a user’s keystrokes with
promising results. TouchLogger [21] was a smartphone ap-
plication designed to infer the keystrokes on a soft keyboard
based solely on the vibrations recorded by the smartphone’s
motion sensors. The research was capable of successfully
inferring more than 70% of the keys that were typed using
only the device‘s accelerometer. However, the work focused
specifically on inferring the keystrokes from a soft keyboard
that contained only numbers. The work that we present in
this paper will look to infer the keystrokes of an individual
that use a standard soft keyboard. Similarly, Xu et al. [22]
present TapLogger, an approach that looks to infer an indi-
vidual’s taps on a numeric keyboard using a smartphone’s
accelerometer and gyroscope. This work differs from our
own in that it focuses on identifying single taps, which are
more susceptible to distortion by linear drift. Our approach
looks to identify pairs of keystrokes, or bigrams, which
provides a much more robust identification method that
is less affected by linear drift. The work of Aviv et al.
[23] builds on the idea of PIN identification using motion
sensors. However, where previous work had focused on
single taps, their work introduces the notion of recognising
and inferring the swipe gestures of a user’s PIN.
More recently Shen et al. [24] have built in the approach
taken by TapLogger [21] with taps being recorded with
the accelerometer with the gyroscope and magnetometer
used to infer the positions of the taps. The authors carried
out an empirical study in line with previous studies, with
30 participants using a range of screen sizes, data sizes
and sampling rates. Their work focused on identifying key
presses on a numeric keypad where they found they could
detect when the key presses occurred 100% of the time
and were able to correctly identify the key that had been
pressed 80% of the time ‘in some cases’. The accuracy of
key detection ranged from 71.4% to 83.9% depending on the
conditions. Again, this work differs from the work that we
present in that it focuses solely on detecting key presses on
a numeric keyboard as opposed to our own work that uses
the an alphanumeric keyboard. Additionally, Shen et al. [24]
aim to identify single taps, as with the work of Xu et al. [22],
which can lead to distortion.
Other work has focused on password compromise, for
example, Owusu et al. [25] uses a smartphone’s accelerom-
eter to infer the characters, both letters and numbers, con-
tained within a user’s password, although with a relatively
small set of only four participants. The work was capable of
extracting the 6 character passwords in around 4.5 attempts.
The work of Miluzzo et al. [26] on TapPrints builds on
this idea of keystroke identification by looking to determine
the location of the tap on a smartphone screen. This is
used initially to understand the icons that may have been
tapped, and so the applications that were launched. This
work then takes this concept further to try and identify
individual keystrokes on a virtual keyboard. This work
focusses on single taps, which again will perhaps provide a
less robust result, that can be susceptible to linear drift. The
results suggest that there is an 80% accuracy in predicting
an individual letter which is in line with our own results
of around 81% accuracy in bigram prediction. However, the
sample size of only 10 volunteers is notably less than the
53 participants in our own work but the dataset of around
40,000 keystrokes is much larger than our own. Our work
collects 138 characters per participant, which is less than the
size of a Tweet, as we are focused on the minimum amount
of data that might be needed to correctly identify a user’s
keystrokes.
The majority of the current work in this area relies solely
on the use of smartphone motion sensors, however, the
work of Narain et al. [27] builds on this idea to incorporate
the stereoscopic microphones on an Android smartphone.
This work developed a method that used both the gyroscope
and stereoscopic microphones on a smartphone and that
was around 90% accurate in its predictions. This work was
conducted with only seven participants and was limited to
three devices (Samsung S2, Samsung Tab 8 and HTC One),
whereas our work allowed for any compatible Android
device.
The majority of the work has focused only on the use of
accelerometer readings, in contrast to our own work, which
includes analysis of rotational data using the smartphone’s
gyroscope. When a phone is being used by an individual
it tends to be held in a hand that is either unsupported or
with the wrists resting on a surface, if the device is being
held in two hands with the thumbs for typing it tends to be
held loosely and tilted in the palms in order that the relevant
keys are closer to the thumb. If a device is held in one hand
the same phenomena occurs however the aim tends to be to
reduce the amount the ‘pecking’ digit has to move. Whilst
these movements are relatively subtle they are observable
both by the human eye and by the smartphone’s sensors.
We anticipate this behaviour is repeatable based on the
concept of motor learning, the process by which individuals
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acquire or develop skills, through experience. Fitts and
Posner [28] suggest a three-stage model of motor learning
where a skill will become more ‘automatic’ as familiarity
increases, this results in a performance requiring little or no
conscious thought. This lack of concious thought has led
to typing on traditional keyboards being as distinguishing
as an individual’s handwriting or signature, since there are
similar governing neurophysiological mechanisms [29], [30].
There is no fundamental reason why this same process of
motor ‘memory’ should not also be the case in governing the
use soft-keyboards on devices and resulting in a repeatable
unconscious motor behaviour.
3 METHOD
The initial pilot experiments in this research used one device
(a Google Nexus 5X) upon which all the experiments were
performed, this demonstrated the correct identification of
approximately two-thirds of pairs of keystrokes that had
been seen before and around a quarter of pairs of key
presses not seen before [31]. This work expands on the
initial research by allowing the results to be gathered from
a range of phones and tablets and by individuals not being
directly supervised by the researcher. It is very important
that a participant is able to use their own phone, our initial
study relied on using a device which they may not have seen
before, this will effect the natural way in which the device
is used and may have under-represented the repeatability
and hence the transition of the model from training to test
phases. This paper also introduces different approaches to
building and matching the model such as Dynamic Time
Warping, these whilst more computationally expensive are
expected to produce significantly improved results.
In order to ensure that the application was available to
a wider audience it was submitted to both the Google Play
store and the Amazon App store, the main App Stores for
the Android ecosystem. A number of previous researchers
have taken similar approaches to delivering research appli-
cations to a wide range of users and devices throughout the
world, most notably the Device Analyser application [32].
The application was compatible with over 13,000 devices
on the Google Play Store, and followed a very simple flow.
An initial Activity provided the consent and participant
information sheet whilst also checking that the device had
the relevant sensors available. Following this participants
were asked a number of demographic questions including:
their age, handedness, how long they had owned the phone
or tablet and how comfortable they were using the key-
board. The next Activity asked how the participant held the
phone whilst typing (whether in the left hand, right hand
or both hands) and what the participant uses to press the
keys (just fingers, just thumbs or both fingers and thumbs).
There were no requirements placed on the orientation of
the device, with the participants free to use the device in
the way in which they felt most comfortable. We found that
the orientation of the device did not impact the results or
accuracy of the research. The participant is then asked to
type a paragraph of fixed text twice, this formed ‘experiment
1’ and ‘experiment 2’, the text was calculated to explore the
full breadth of the keyboard whilst being short enough to
be approximately the length of a tweet (132 characters):
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Fig. 1. Example timeseries captured from the gyroscope.
fly me to the moon and let me play among the stars
our freedom of speech is freedom or death we have got to
fight the powers that be
The participants were then asked to type a random set
of English words that were constructed from the bigrams
(two character substrings) in the fixed text, this formed
‘experiment 3’. Finally participants were asked how easy
they found the task and how distracted they were. The
application then launched their email program and attached
the data files with the final consent form and the participants
were asked to re-read the consent form before sending
the data to the researchers. During the study the device
recorded the outputs from the gyroscope sensor and the
accelerometer. These time-series along with the key down
and key up times from the keyboard form the main ex-
perimental data. During the study it was assumed that all
participants were stationary, although this was no explicitly
specified. It is entirely possible that the accuracy of the
results could be altered in different scenarios, for example
when walking. The research presented here does not assume
that this attack would be successful in all scenarios. For this
study auto-complete was disabled in order to rely purely
on the observed typing behaviour, and at this stage ‘swipe’
keyboards were disabled so the participants purely used the
standard action of pressing individual keys.
The sensors on smartphones are generally small devices
and often subject to drift, by using the rotation from one key-
press to another keypress to characterise the two keypresses
this method is only affected by the non-linear component
of changes in the sensor performance. Should we attempt
to identify individual keypresses using the gyroscope and
accelerometer we would be affected by both the linear
and non-linear changes in the sensor performance. It may
be possible to use tri-grams or higher orders of n-gram,
however the volume and diversity of training data required
becomes significant.
An example of the data gathered as part of the experi-
ment is shown in Figures 1 and 2 for one example user.
Participants were recruited across traditional social me-
dia channels using snowball sampling [33] and also publi-
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Fig. 2. Example timeseries captured from the accelerometer.
cising the study through participant recruitment channels
of Reddit and other websites. This wider reach attempted
to reach as broad a range of smartphone and tablet users as
possible. The study recruited 53 participants, all of whom
were over the age of 18.
4 ANALYSIS
The cohort was recruited with the age distribution shown in
Figure 3, as can be seen most participants fall into the 20—
40 age bracket with the largest group of participants being
in their thirties. The participants generally had their device
for less than 18 months, as shown in Figure 4 and generally
considered themselves at least comfortable with the soft-
keyboard as seen in Figure 5. We found no correlation
between the participants’ age and how comfortable they
were with the soft-keyboard, we also found no correlation
between how long the participant had owned the device
and how comfortable they considered themselves to be.
However, as could have been predicted we did find a
correlation between how comfortable a participant was with
a soft keyboard and how easy they found the task (when
asked after the experiments), a Pearson’s Chi squared test
resulted in a Chi squared statistic of 15.877 (p-value of
0.01443).
Through distributing the application across the App
Stores the aim of the study was to explore the performance
not only across a variety of individuals but also a variety of
devices. The participants used a range of phones and tablets
from a number of different manufacturers, see Figure 6, this
distribution is well aligned with that we would expect to
see in the Android marketplace, for example as shown in
[34] with the exception of Lenovo devices potentially being
under-represented within our sample.
As we would expect the devices used in this study had
a range of sizes and screen resolutions the resolutions were
grouped into the descriptive terms used by the Android OS
which are defined as MDPI (x ≤ 200), HDPI (200 ≤ x <
280), XHDPI (280 ≤ x < 400), XXHDPI (400 ≤ x < 560)
and XXXHDPI (560 ≤ x).
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Fig. 3. Distribution of the age of the study participants.
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Fig. 4. Distribution of the length of time participants have had the device.
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Fig. 5. How comfortable participants were with their device keyboards.
The physical size was calculated using the resolution and
the screen size in pixels — it should be noted that this is only
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Fig. 6. The device manufacturers used by participants in the study.
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Fig. 7. The resolution of devices used by participants in the study.
the touchscreen size and does not include the size of the
bezel or external housing. The distribution of the device res-
olution and sizes are shown in Figures 7 and 8 respectively,
these show that most devices had higher screen resolutions
(consistent with most devices being under 18 months old)
and generally between 4.5 and 6 inches (consistent with
smartphone or small ‘phablet’ sizes) in addition to a number
of 7 and 10 inch tablets.
The Android ecosystem divides device sizes into Small
(≤ 3.5 Inch), Normal (3.5 ≤ x < 5), Large (5 ≤ x < 7) and
XLarge (7 ≤ x). Interestingly whilst there are indications
of a relationship between the device size and the comfort
level with users of Large and XLarge devices generally
being less comfortable than those of normal sized, a Pear-
son’s Chi-sqaured test resulted in a statistic of 12.17 and a
p-value approaching significance at 0.058. Approximately
three quarters of those participants with XLarge devices
reported they were uncomfortable with the soft-keyboard.
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Fig. 8. The size of devices used by participants in the study.
4.1 Identification of Key Presses
As described previously the approach that we take in this
research is the use of the motion of the device in order to
identify the bigram that was typed. We must first identify
the timestamps of the two key presses forming the bigram
and then use the rotation between those timestamps to
identify the letters forming the bigram.
The first step in this approach is to be able to identify
the key presses, for this we use the accelerometer on the
device. We annotated a key press when the magnitude
of the acceleration component exceeded a threshold, this
threshold was derived using the key press data gathered in
the training phase of experiment 1. This threshold was not
constant across the study, and was a result of the training
phase using experiment 1 and hence was a function of both
the individual’s typing and the device.
The magnitude of the acceleration was found to be
the most discriminative for the identification of the key
presses, for some devices the acceleration in the ‘z’ direction
(i.e. ‘into’ the device) was also discriminative, however we
found that for some larger devices the performance was
worse than using the magnitude.
The magnitude of the accelerometer measure for an
example user is shown in Figure 9. This shows the optimum
threshold for this particular user working as derived from
the training data associated with experiment 1.
The Relative Operating Characteristics (ROC) [35], [36]
of this detection process is shown in Figure 10, as can be
seen the performance of the detector is, in general, good.
The Area Under Curve (AUC) metric is the probability
that a classifier will rank a randomly chosen positive in-
stance higher than a randomly chosen negative one [37].
A boxplot of this metric for each participant across the ex-
periments are shown in Figure 11, the average performance
being 0.885, in effect correctly identifying the time at which
key presses occur approximately nine out of ten times.
4.2 Identification of Bigrams
In this research we are primarily interested in identifying the
potential side-channel available through the movement of
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Fig. 9. An example of the threshold used for the keypress detection.
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Fig. 10. The Relative Operating Characteristic of a simple threshold
detector for detecting key presses.
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Fig. 11. The AUC metric for detecting key presses across the three
experiments.
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Fig. 12. The example model components for the bigrams ‘fl’ and ‘ly’.
the device and as such the initial mechanism that was used
to identify the bigrams used a very simple model. More
complex models are explored in Section 4.5.
Initially this process trained a model for an individual
participant on the recordings from experiment 1, this model
was then validated using experiment 2 and 3. Using experi-
ment 1 as training data we first identify the rotation vectors
in x, y and z dimensions that are associated with each
bigram, i.e. the time-series from the rotation sensor from the
first key-down until the second key-up. These time-series
were resampled to a common number of regular samples (in
this case 1,000 per bigram) to remove any linear variation in
the flight time between key presses. Each vector component
is then normalised by removing the mean — this was found
to reduce the effect from previous bigrams since the model
now simply encodes the change in rotation rather than being
dependent on the starting orientation of the phone. Where
bigrams had multiple occurrences in the training data the
vectors were averaged.
An example of the model components for one user is
shown in Figure 12. There are some similarities in the
x and y rotation captured in the model, however model
components capturing the rotation in the z direction are the
inverse of each other. Noting the positions of the ’f’, ’l’ and
’y’ keys on a keyboard we can clearly see the left-to-right
motion captured for the ’fl’ bigram and then right-to-left
motion captured for the ’ly’ bigram in the rotation in the z
dimension.
This model was then verified against the data from
experiment 2 and 3, this process identified key presses
using the approach described in Section 4.1, the rotation
vectors were then extracted between these timepoints. These
rotation vectors were then resampled and the bigram in
the model with the lowest RMS error was deemed to be
the corresponding bigram. This very simple ‘naive model’
treats each bigram as completely independent meaning that
a poor prediction in one bigram is not propagated to those
adjoining bigrams.
We can create a more realistic model since, logically, the
first letter of a bigram must be the last letter of the pre-
ceding bigram. This ‘bigram model’ takes the error across
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TABLE 1
Example bigram scores from Naive model.
Position 1 Position 2 Position 3
Bigram RMS Err. Bigram RMS Err. Bigram RMS Err.
|ab| 0.01 |bc| 0.03 |t | 0.04
|db| 0.05 |ec| 0.06 |c | 0.05
|ae| 0.07 |bu| 0.10 |um| 0.15
TABLE 2
Resulting Bigram model sentences from the example Naive model
output shown in Table 1.
Sentence Total Error
|abc | 0.01 + 0.03 + 0.05 = 0.09
|dbc | 0.05 + 0.03 + 0.05 = 0.13
|aec | 0.07 + 0.06 + 0.05 = 0.18
|abum| 0.01 + 0.10 + 0.15 = 0.26
|dbum| 0.05 + 0.10 + 0.15 = 0.30
all predictions of individual bigrams and attempts to create
the sentence with the lowest overall error which obeys the
logical rule that a bigram must start with the preceding
bigram’s end letter. Initially this method uses the naive
predictions which give an error measure of a particular
bigram in a particular position in the sentence, in the naive
model we simply take the bigram in a particular position
which produces the minimum error. In this ‘bigram model’
we take the first bigram in the first position, then consider
all the bigrams in the second position which begin with the
end letter of the bigram in the first position. This represents
the possible two bigram combinations which are logically
possible, the error term of these bigram pairs is then the sum
of the individual error terms. This process continues until
the all logically possible combinations beginning with the
most likely start bigram have been calculated, the process
then moves onto the next possible start bigram. Hence we
calculate the error term for all logically possible combina-
tions of bigrams, to manage the computational challenge of
this at every level we only retain the million combinations
that have the lowest error. Note, this logical assumption
does not consider the use of language or the fact that
some bigrams are more likely in some languages. A trivial
example of this process is shown in Tables 1 and 2.
The ability of these two models, the ‘naive model’ and
the ‘bigram model’, is shown in Figure 13, the accuracy is
measured as the number of correctly guessed bigrams nor-
malised to the number of bigrams. Average performances
of 49.5% and 69.7% were displayed from text that has been
seen before and 10.5% and 16.1% for new text. While this
performance may appear low, note that this performance
is from a single piece of training text less than the size of a
tweet (132 characters) using a trivially simple model, and for
some participants this performance is significantly higher.
We found that the errors were not randomly distributed
across the bigrams. The ten most common confusions are
shown in Table 3, this shows the normalised count of
confusions, i.e. the number of times bigrams are incorrectly
guessed normalised by the number of times the bigram
appears in the text. As can be seen the most common
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Fig. 13. The accuracy across the two different experiments using the two
different methods.
TABLE 3
The most commonly confused bigrams.
Truth Predicted Normalised Count
|s | |e | 10.7
|h | |b | 9.0
|le| |me| 8.0
|h | |n | 8.0
|h | |om| 8.0
|t | |r | 7.8
|e | |d | 7.7
|at| |ar| 7.5
|t | |e | 7.2
|h | |to| 7.0
mistakes are generally close on the keyboard.
It is noteworthy that 62.4% of the errors are caused by
bigrams that involve the space-bar, the space-bar is signif-
icantly wider than other keys this means the target area
for the digit is much larger than for other keys. This larger
target means that the user is less constrained as they move
from key-to-key and hence the behaviour is less repeatable.
For example, the error with the highest normalised count
was mistaking the bigram s followed by SPACE with the
bigram e followed by SPACE. The keys s and e are adjacent
on a keyboard with the space bar underneath both and
hence the rotation of the phone or tablet will be similar
between the two bigrams; this means a user is likely to
use a similar movement to transition from one keypress to
another. Should the start keys be further apart the center
of the rotation of the device is likely to involve a more
discriminatory component in the ‘roll’ of the device.
Figure 14 shows the Cumulative Distribution Function
(CDF) of the distance from the correct key to the key that
was in error. From this we can see when an error occurs that
around 40% of the first letter of the bigram when in error
was within 2 keys of the correct letter and around 50% of
the second letters when in error were within 2 keys.
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Fig. 14. The distance between the correct and predicted key for the
bigrams in error.
4.3 Factors affecting the accuracy
In our initial work on this topic we explored a small subset
of factors that could influence the accuracy of the prediction
method including whether fingers or thumbs were used to
type on the soft-keyboard, how comfortable the participant
was with the keyboard and the median flight-time per
participant (that is the time from a key-up to the next key-
down) and we found no effect from these factors [31]. Since
this initial study only used one smartphone (a Nexus 5X) we
were unable to explore the effect the device itself had on the
accuracy, and since most participants were not ‘owners’ of
the phone they had less opportunity to become comfortable
with the device and keyboard (particularly salient for non-
Android users).
Understanding the factors that modulate the accuracy
of the predictions is essential in fully understanding the
phenomena and whether this form of information leakage
is more of a threat to particular individuals or devices in the
Android ecosystem.
Initially we explored the effect of the age on the accuracy
of the most successful prediction experiment (that of using
the bigram approach on text that had been seen previously).
A boxplot of the effect of age is shown in Figure 15, from this
plot it appears that there is no evidence that performance is
modulated by the age of the participants, this is confirmed
with a Pearson’s Chi-squared test (test statistic of 0.127 and
a p-value of 0.364)
The length of ownership is also of interest, again there
was no correlation between how long the device has been
owned and the accuracy — a Pearson’s Chi-squared test
confirms this (test statistic of -0.069 and a p-value of 0.623).
Mechanically the physical size of the phone or device
will have some effect on how it is used, for this analysis we
break the devices down using the Android ‘size’ metric. The
accuracy of the approach broken down by the size is shown
in Figure 16. As can be seen the performance on ‘XLarge’
(i.e. those over 7 inches) devices appears to be higher than
those ‘Normal’ or ’Large’ size. This is confirmed with two-
sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests as shown in Table 4 which
shows that participants using a device over 7 inches in
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Fig. 15. The accuracy from different age participants.
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Fig. 16. The effect of the device size on the accuracy.
TABLE 4
The test statistic from two-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for the size
of the device, p-values are denoted by * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01..
Small Normal Large XLarge
Small No data
Normal - 0.250 0.632 *
Large - - 0.500
XLarge - - -
size in general resulted in an increase in accuracy over
those using smaller phones, albeit at a significance level of
8.7%. It is notable from inspection of the model parameters
that the rotation vectors associated with larger devices tend
to be larger than the parameters associated with smaller
phones. This indicates the mechanical rotation of larger
tablets during typing is greater.
The final question, before the study itself, asked the par-
ticipant how comfortable they were using the soft-keyboard,
the Kernel Density Estimation (KDE) is shown in Figure 17.
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Fig. 17. The effect of comfort with the device on the accuracy of the
predictions.
We were unable to find a significant correlation between the
accuracies across all the factors (from Very Uncomfortable to
Very Comfortable), however the Uncomfortable factor was
significantly higher accuracy than the very comfortable as
shown in Table 5. Since the majority of the Xlarge devices
were associated with users who were Uncomfortable with a
smartphone keyboard it is difficult to isolate these factors.
The comfort level explored in Figure 17 is a self-declared
comfort level, potentially of more interest is the actual ob-
served typing speed as this is likely to be a better indicator
of the skill level. The median flight-time (the time between
releasing one key and pressing the next) of an individual’s
performance was calculated and no significant relationship
was found with respect to the accuracy.
In addition to these factors surrounding the participants,
the accuracy may also be a factor of how the device is held
and used. The accuracy of the prediction when broken down
by handedness and the hand in which the device is held is
shown in Figure 18. Across these six groups (three different
approaches to holding the phone or tablet and right- and
left-handedness) there was no statistically significant differ-
ence between the performance of the prediction system. Two
of the groups associated with left-handed participants who
hold their device in their right hand or both hands were
potentially under-represented, however given the number
of participants this potentially is an uncommon use pattern.
In combination with how the device is held the digit
that is used to press the keys may also have an effect on the
accuracy, the digit could be just the fingers (typically with
the device held in the other hand), just the thumbs (typically
with it held in both hands) or a mixture of the two. The KDE
covering the accuracy of the prediction as a function of these
different use patterns is shown in Figure 19.
In this case there does appear to be some variation
between the different use patterns, two-sided Kolmogorov-
Smirnov tests were performed across the three factors and
the results are shown in Table 6. As can be seen there is a
statistical difference between those who type with just their
fingers and just their thumbs (the relatively uncommon con-
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Fig. 18. The effect of how the device is held on the accuracy of the
predictions.
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Fig. 19. The effect of how key is pressed on the accuracy of the
predictions.
dition where people use both does show some reduction in
performance it does not achieve statistical significance). This
reduction in performance is explained by directly observing
the traces associated from the devices - in general when the
device is held in both hands and the thumbs used for the
key presses the magnitude of the rotation vectors tend to be
smaller and hence the discriminatory power is reduced.
As previously described the length of ownership has no
effect on the accuracy of the process, however this measure
is linked to the age of the device, as part of the data
capture the manufacturer and model of the phone or tablet
is captured and this was used to calculate the age, we could
find no evidence of a relationship between the age and the
accuracy. After the experiment the participants were asked
how focused they were during the task and also how easy
they found the task, this is particularly interesting given that
predictive text was disabled so it was important to gather
how easy the participant found the experiment. However,
we found no correlation between accuracy and the how easy
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TABLE 5
The test statistic from two-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for the effect of how comfortable the participant was with the soft-keyboard, p-values
are denoted by * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Very Uncomfortable Uncomfortable Comfortable Very Comfortable
Very Uncomfortable - 0.343 0.343 0.596
Uncomfortable - - 0.407 0.658 ***
Comfortable - - - 0.362
Very Comfortable - - - -
TABLE 6
The test statistic from two-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for the
different ways in which a keypress occurs, p-values are denoted by *
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Just Fingers Just Thumbs Both
Just Fingers - 0.380 ** 0.444 *
Just Thumbs - - 0.325
Both - - -
the participant found the task or how distracted they were.
Having analysed the effects of these various factors in
isolation we attempted to build linear models for the accu-
racy given the combination of these factors. No model was
able to explain more than 22% of the variance, as measured
by the adjusted R-squared value [38] indicating that none
of the factors captured in this study are predictive of the
accuracy, other than those discussed previously.
4.4 Stability in prediction over time
As discussed in the introduction the sensors involved in
smartphones and tablets are small, sensitive and subject
to drift over time. The experiment was re-run with a 10%
sample of the participants - this sample was taken to ensure
a spread of devices. This experiment ran 6 months after the
initial experiment and was aimed at exploring the effect of
changes in sensor behaviour over time.
For all users the performance was within 5% of the initial
experiment (with an average difference of 0.2 %) indicat-
ing similar performance levels. More interestingly, further
analysis used the training data from the first run to build
a model that was then used to predict the keypresses from
data acquired 6 months later. This resulted in an average
performance decrease of 8.1%.
This decrease can be attributed to the non-linear drift in
the sensor, as we are using the relative change in the phone
from one keypress to the next in order to infer the pair of
keypresses we are unaffected by any linear drift.
4.5 Complex models
To this point we have demonstrated a very simple approach
to modelling the side-channel leakage, through building
a model from the recorded time series during the train-
ing phase (experiment 1). By visual inspection the models
representing the bigrams were generally smooth curves.
In this example the full time-series that was used to en-
capsulate the model for each bigram could be replaced
TABLE 7
The average accuracy using a polynomial approximation for the model
across the different experiments.
Experiment Accuracy (%) Performance change (%)
Naive training 44.8 % -9.42 %
Bigram training 66.1 % -5.18 %
Naive unseen 9.90 % -5.70 %
Bigram unseen 15.2 % -5.54 %
with the coefficients from a polynomial function. A fourth-
order polynomial was found to be the minimum order of
polynomial that was able to fit the data well.
By simplifying the model using this polynomial approxi-
mation it was possible to reduce the size of the model by 250
times - particularly important if the model is to be stored
on the device and used in real-time. This simplification
leads to a small decrease of the average performance across
the experiments of approximately 5 to 6%. In some cases,
particularly models that performed poorly, this approach
actually improved the accuracy by reducing the noise com-
ponent within the training phase of the model creation.
Table 7 compares the performance of the full model and
the polynomial approximation.
This very simple model for the rotation provides a
benchmark for the lowest possible performance that a rel-
atively unskilled author of a malicious application could
achieve. A more complex process for comparing the tem-
plates within the model and those provided by a captured
time-series could exploit Dynamic Time Warping (DTW)
[39], [40], [41] in order to reduce the effect of any variation
in the typing speed between bigrams. DTW is a process
by which the similarity between two timeseries can be
evaluated independent of non-linear variations in their time
dimension. Essentially this approach is used to ‘mitigate
against distortions in the time axis’ [42]. There are several
other variants on DTW (e.g. weighted and derivative DTW)
that can be used when comparing timeseries. However
Lines and Bagnall [43] suggest when there is a warping
window size that is set through cross-validation then DTW
is ‘commonly accepted as the gold standard against which
to compare alternative measures.’ This allows us to calculate
the similarity between the training data and a later sam-
pled timeseries, independent of the time taken to tap the
bigrams. In the simple model we assume that any variation
in the time taken to type a bigram is inherently linear, i.e.
if an individual takes 20% longer to type a bigram this
increase in time is distributed evenly across the bigram.
Using Dynamic Time Warping, rather than the RMS error, to
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calculate the similarity between a measured timeseries and
a given bigram from the training data allows us to remove
this assumption. This allows us to consider the non-linear
variation in the timeseries from the sensors, however there
is a significant impact on the computational requirement.
The use of DTW does however significantly increases
performance across the four experiments as shown in ta-
ble 8, indicating there is a significant non-linear component
in the time dimension of the sampled data. This shows that
if we have the complete word in the training set we can,
on average, accurately identify over 81% of bigrams, if we
have seen the bigram before but not the word in which it
appears we can identify, on average, nearly 30 % of bigrams.
It is worth noting that this is the average performance and
the variation from the mean is difficult to predict for an
individual user. However, there is some evidence that larger
devices lead to a greater accuracy as do users who type with
their fingers whilst holding the device in one hand.
4.6 Comparative results
As previously discussed in Section 2 there are a number
of existing approaches to keystroke inference using smart-
phone motion sensors. The research presented in this paper
offers a number of improvements over existing studies both
in terms of the robustness of the approach and also the
results achieved.
TouchLogger [21] focused on determining the keystrokes
on a smartphone soft keyboard using the accelerometer
alone. This method was capable of inferring more than 70%
of a keystrokes. However, this approach was limited to only
using a numeric keypad, whereas our work uses an al-
phanumeric keypad. The work carried out in TouchLogger,
by Cai and Chen, used a single device to collect data, an
HTC Evo 4G. The work presented in this paper used an An-
droid application that was freely available and as such we
were able to infer results from a variety of devices and also
away from strict experimental conditions; participants were
free to hold the device in the way that most comfortable to
them.
The work of Xu et al. [22], TapLogger, uses a similar
approach to Cai and Chen [21] in that they aim to infer
keystrokes on a numeric keypad. However, like our own
research Xu et al. make use of both the accelerometer and
gyroscope. The experiments that they carried out were in
a controlled environment on two specific devices (Google
Nexus (One) and an HTC Aria). The training data amounted
to approximately 400 taps, significantly more than our ap-
proach, which required less than 140 characters. Our own
research divides keystrokes in bigrams, whereas Xu et al.
aim to extract single taps. This approach has the potential
to be affected by linear drift. The experiments carried out
as part of TapLogger show accuracies of between 70% and
99%, depending on the user. Whilst our approach may not
have the same levels of accuracy (as seen in Table 8), we
believe that our research offers a robust and cross-device
approach capable of inferring alphanumeric keystrokes.
Perhaps the closest work to our own is that of Shen et
al. [24], this approach still looked to infer keystrokes on
a numeric keypad but worked with a number of different
devices, data sizes and sampling rates. Their work is ca-
pable of detecting when a keystroke has occurred 100% of
TABLE 8
The average accuracy using DTW across the different experiments.
Experiment Accuracy (%) Performance change (%)
Naive training 64.6 % 30.58 %
Bigram training 81.0 % 16.25 %
Naive unseen 18.9 % 80.29%
Bigram unseen 29.5 % 83.20 %
the time, which is comparable with our own results. The
accuracy achieved was between 71.4% and 83.9%, but this
was dependent on the conditions. Again, the experiments
for this work were carried in a controlled environment;
while there were three different devices used this is still not
comparable to our own open experiment.
5 IMPLICATIONS
The naive approach to protecting against this attack is
through requiring an application to explicitly request per-
mission to access the motion sensors for a device. However,
it could be argued that this is largely impractical since the
use of these sensors is so pervasive within applications
and is key to many of the ‘seamless’ parts of the mobile
experience and increasingly leveraged through higher level
APIs such as the Android Activity detection.
Many applications will also have valid requirements for
creating background processes with listeners attached to the
motion sensors, for example fitness trackers. However, it
is more realistic to require these applications that launch
background process which then attach to sensors to ex-
plicitly request permissions. This would reduce the main
threat demonstrated in this research (that of the leakage of
information from one sensitive application to a background
process started by a malicious application).
The granting of permissions for background applications
to access a different activity is already performed with the
‘accessibility’ function, in which an application requests the
ability to read from a different ‘Activity’ — it should be
noted, however, that the user experience for this process is
generally poor. It is also worth noting, that this would result
in a complicated situation where the access to the sensors
may or may not require permissions depending on a fairly
technical description on how it is accessed — this is not an
ideal situation for the common user of these devices who
is already struggling to make rational decisions from this
permissions model [10].
The current trends are for devices to have more accurate,
lower noise and faster sampling sensors — largely driven
by the desire for virtual or augmented reality experiences.
Schemes such as Google’s Daydream specification are en-
couraging devices to be better at sensing both the world
around them and its position and movement through the
environment. The ability to better sense the world around
the device will, inevitably, increase the potential for sensitive
information to leak from within an application through this
channel.
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6 CONCLUSION
The research presented in this paper has demonstrated how
it is possible to estimate the text that has been typed purely
from the motion sensors — explicitly the gyroscope and
accelerometer. Using a very short training dataset (less than
the size of a tweet) we were able to correctly infer, on
average, over 81% of bigrams forming words that were
part of the training set. We were able to correctly identify
nearly 30% of the bigrams in words that were not part of
the training data. Whilst this may appear low, it is still
of concern given the very small training size and the fact
that typically languages have significant redundancy in both
word and sentence structure [44], [45], [46], [47], which often
allows pragmatics to be extracted from incomplete text.
This attack could potentially lead to the leakage of
sensitive data from a secure application through this ‘zero-
permission’ channel. From our experiment we were not able
to identify any particular characteristics of users or devices
that were more vulnerable than others, however we did find
that the accuracy tended to be higher for larger devices and
users who used their fingers rather than thumbs to type.
This research highlights the risk of leakage of poten-
tially sensitive information from one application to another,
potentially malicious, application. The results have shown
that even with very simple models a good level of accuracy
can be achieved, by using more computationally expensive
approaches such as dynamic time warping this can be signif-
icantly improved. It is also worth noting that this research
does not leverage the inherent redundancy within written
languages which means that there is no requirement for
100% accuracy to infer semantic meaning from the content.
In this paper we also highlight some of the challenges
for defending against these attacks, a number of potential
approaches have been suggested although most are chal-
lenging or would have significant impacts to either the user
experience or the Android ecosystem.
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